Abstract: This paper provides an empirical analysis of the role of intergovernmental interaction in countries' compliance with an international environmental agreement (IEA). We use two cross-sectional data sets that contain information on signatory countries' compliance with an IEA on responsible fisheries. Our empirical strategy is based on estimating a spatial Durbin model using a maximum likelihood procedure. The results show that compliance effort by other participants has a systematic positive effect on a country's own compliance. We argue that these findings provide empirical evidence that intergovernmental relations can improve the performance of voluntary IEAs where other formal sanction mechanisms are absent.
nonsignatory countries at the participation stage nor free-riding from actual signatory countries at the enforcement stage (e.g., fulfilling the obligations specified in the agreement). The governments of signatory nations have little incentive to actually enforce an agreement's obligations, and therefore the ratification of an IEA alone does not guarantee any success (Finus and Tjøtta 2003) . Interestingly, numerous IEAs are ratified each year, although their benefits are nonrival and nonexcludable.
In this paper we argue that one possible explanation for the ratification of often merely symbolic treaties is intergovernmental interaction among the signatory countries. The work by Ostrom (1990) suggests that interaction among individuals and a credible threat of sanctions can help to discourage free-riding and enforce sustainable harvesting rules for open access resources, at least at the community level. On an international level, these conditions also exist and are sometimes even more pronounced. Countries do not act independently of each other and can relatively easily observe whether another signatory nation complies with an agreement or not.
1 In addition, governments have various means to impose sanctions on noncomplying countries, ranging from diplomatic isolation to trade embargoes or the denial of access to an economic or military union.
2
The aim of this study is to empirically analyze whether intergovernmental interaction helps to enforce the obligations of a voluntary IEA on an open access resource. In particular, we use two cross-sectional data sets to measure signatory countries' compliance with the obligations of Article 7 of the 1995 UN Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CoC), a voluntary IEA. The first data set, CoC indicators, contains evaluation information on each signee's compliance effort and was compiled for 2005 by an international panel of experts (Pitcher, Kalikoski, Short, et al. 2009) . Although the country sample in the report accounts for almost 96% of the global marine fish catch, the number of observations is only 53. Unfortunately, it is not possible to increase the number of observations because the data source is a report that was produced in 2008 by a large group of international experts. Therefore, we compiled a second set of indicators, quantitative indicators, where data are available for a larger set of signatory countries (100+). This set of indicators includes variables that either measure the effect of sustainable fishing practices on fish stock directly or reflect more sustainable national fishing policies. In particular, the indicators used in 1. For example, WTO case no. 58, Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis08 _e.htm.
2. As a result of the "mackerel war" with the European Union (EU), Iceland (temporarily) lowered its mackerel quota to ease the potential risks to its EU membership application process. http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/iceland-lowers-mackerel-quota-ap-news-517545. the robustness section are the total area of Marine Protected Areas (MPA) and the Marine Trophic Index (MTI), a biodiversity indicator based on the mean trophic level of fish landings.
We use measures of geographical and political distance among the signatory nations to calculate the spatially lagged compliance effort based on different spatial weights. This variable serves as the empirical proxy for the potential to observe other members' compliance effort and sanction noncompliance. We interpret the estimated coefficient of the spatial lag as the effect of intergovernmental interaction on compliance behavior.
However, a causal interpretation of the estimated coefficient of the spatial lag is complicated because a signatory country's own and all other signatory countries' compliance efforts are determined simultaneously. Applying a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator would yield inconsistent estimates and biased coefficients of the spatially lagged dependent variable. To address this endogeneity issue, we apply a maximum likelihood (ML) procedure to estimate a spatial Durbin model (SDM), which is a spatial autoregressive model that allows for a spatial autoregressive process in the dependent variable as well as in the explanatory variables (Pace, LeSage, and Zhu 2013 ). The SDM model has two advantages: First, it provides consistent parameter estimates even if the true data-generating process is a spatial lag or a spatial error model (LeSage and Pace 2009 ). Second, the SDM nests several other spatial models and therefore provides a general framework to test this model against alternative specifications (Elhorst 2010) .
Our results indicate that intergovernmental interaction has a systematic impact on a country's level of compliance. Other countries' compliance behavior acts as a strategic complement, and the effect decreases in distance. We also find that, among others, a country's quality of governance, the share of fish catch in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and its engagement in other IEAs have a significant positive effect on the compliance level. In general, variables that improve the allocation of property rights in one country seem to generate spatial spillover effects on compliance effort.
This paper relates to the following strands of literature: First, it builds an empirical complement to the theoretical work on the potential effect of repeated governmental interaction on countries' compliance with IEAs on renewable resources. This strand of literature basically builds upon Ostrom (1990) and her work on the effect of repeated interaction among community members on the sustainable management of an open access resource. Burton (2003) incorporates these ideas into a more formal model on community enforcement of voluntary effort restrictions on fisheries. Bratberg, Tjøtta, and Oines (2005) then extend the argument to the international level and suggest that the enforcement of a treaty's obligations via strategic interaction of the signees could also be a valid explanation for the existence of IEAs. In a recent study Davies and Naughton (2014) empirically show that a country's decision to participate in IEAs is positively influenced by the number of IEAs its neighbors have signed. However, by focusing on the participation decision, that is, the ratification of an agreement, they were not able to analyze the impact of strategic interaction on a country's enforcement effort. To our knowledge, this paper is the first empirical test of the proposition that intergovernmental interaction can have a systematic effect on the compliance with an IEA on a renewable resource.
This type of empirical question links our paper to a second strand of literature, namely, empirical studies on the spatial properties of signees' compliance with environmental agreements. In general, these studies analyze environmental agreements on the management of more global (e.g., Murdoch, Sandler, and Vijverberg 2003) or more local (e.g., Fredriksson and Millimet 2002) public goods (i.e., emission reductions). Therefore, one area in this literature applies spatial econometric techniques to overcome the problem of migrating emissions in measuring an individual country's reduction effort. Murdoch et al. (2003) , Maddison (2007) , and Davies and Naughton (2014) point out that the econometric analysis of the reduction effort of transboundary pollution is complicated by the fact that an individual country's effort is hard to measure, as each country's total depositions of a pollutant are the sum of its own emissions and that of other countries.
The application of spatial econometric models and the knowledge of the pollutants' geographic migration patterns help to reveal each country's emission reduction effort. However, they were not able to isolate the effect of intergovernmental relations on compliance effort. In our case, we directly observe each country's compliance effort. Thus, we do not face the problem of transboundary spillovers. We should therefore be able to interpret the coefficient of the spatial lag as the effect of intergovernmental relations.
A number of studies within this strand of literature deal with the emission reduction effort by comparing differences in the stringency of state (e.g., Fredriksson and Millimet 2002) or nationwide environmental regulations (e.g., Eliste and Fredriksson 2004) . Within this second area, our paper strongly relates to the study by Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) , who account for interaction in environmental policy making among governments at the US state level by including the abatement levels of neighboring states as explanatory variables. Their results imply that US states with more stringent environmental policies have a positive "pull" effect on their neighbors' abatement decisions. In contrast to our study, Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) compare environmental regulation that is not based on an agreement but rather analyze yardstick competition in environmental stringency. In addition, the absence of a legal agreement between states makes it difficult to define defecting behavior and therefore leaves hardly any ground for sanctions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 1 provides information on the Code of Conduct and discusses the theoretical background. Section 2 explains our empirical strategy, and section 3 presents the data. Section 4 discusses the results, and section 5 concludes. (Hosch, Ferraro, and Failler 2011) . The CoC consists of 12 articles: the first six articles mainly describe the legal framework of the CoC, while articles 7-12 are of a more technical nature and define the CoC's objectives. Most importantly, the CoC is nonbinding, with the principles and standards provided in the legal text being of a voluntary nature only. In 2005, after 10 years of CoC, 53 countries (accounting for 96% of the global marine catch) had been evaluated according to their compliance with the CoC's suggestions made in Article 7 for sustainable fisheries (Pitcher, Kalikoski, Short, et al. 2009 ). The results have been quite disillusioning. Not one of those countries evaluated reached an overall compliance score of more than 60%. The authors suggest that this lack of compliance is mainly due to the voluntary nature of this international environmental agreement.
A second assessment by Hosch et al. (2011) using nine case studies comes to a similar conclusion, that is, although many signatory countries have implemented laws that reflect the objective of the CoC, an actual change in fishing practices is rarely observed. They suggest that lack of political will and administrative inertia are among the reasons why the positive influence of the CoC on domestic laws is not translated into real action.
3. This agreement is just one among many voluntary IEAs on fisheries management (e.g., the UN Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of December 10, 1982, which relates to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks). The reason for choosing the CoC for this study is simply data availability. Our empirical exercise requires quantifiable measures of a country's compliance effort, which to our knowledge has not been collected for other voluntary IEAs. Although performance of other IEAs has been evaluated in most cases, its assessment is only of a qualitative nature. In contrast, the study by Pitcher, Kalikoski, Short, et al. (2009) evaluates participatory countries' compliance behavior under the CoC after 10 years and translates this evaluation into a rich set of numeric performance indicators.
Intergovernmental Interdependencies in Compliance Behavior
We assume that a country's compliance effort with an IEA on responsible fisheries is mainly influenced by the costs and benefits associated with signing and complying with it. While the standard economic literature on IEAs (e.g., Barrett 1994) takes the negotiating government as exogenously given, we assume that politicians who are responsible for negotiating and enforcing an IEA are driven by reelection concerns. Persson and Tabellini (1992) were among the first to analyze the effects of strategic voting on the outcome of multilateral agreements in a theoretical framework. Buchholz, Haupt, and Peters (2005) extend this analysis to IEAs. 4 Finus and Tjøtta (2003) find that a government will increase its reelection probability if the electoral benefits of compliance exceed its domestic and international costs.
In the case of IEAs on fisheries, it is reasonable to assume that reelection probability mainly depends on two groups of voters in society: general citizens and the fishing industry. If the general public has some green preferences for sustainable management of international fish stocks, one might think of this as the value attached to the existence of a certain fish species, for example. However, obtaining information about the optimal set of rules to ensure a sustainable level of harvest is costly for each citizen. Therefore, the average citizen might be badly informed. The politician can capture support from "uninformed green voters" twice: first, simply by signing a merely symbolic but visible IEA and second, if the industry complies or even overcomplies, the voters might attribute this success to the (unobservable) enforcement effort of the politician.
Regarding the domestic costs of signing and enforcing an IEA, a first subset of costs comprises loss in voters' utility due to the IEA. The support for IEAs on certain pollutants (e.g., CO 2 ) is in general rather low because the IEA's obligations confer costs on the average citizen as well (e.g., higher energy prices). However, the situation is different for IEAs on biodiversity or fisheries, which mainly affect a very small industry and therefore only a minor fraction of the population. In most of today's economies, the fishing industry has become an increasingly unimportant sector when it comes to employment and contribution to GDP.
5 However, this does not necessarily suggest that the government is not paying attention to demands from 4. Eckert (2003) examined the effect of constitutional rules on participation and enforcement of an IEA in a two-country model where each country consists of two federal subregions. Depending on the delegation of powers between the federal and the regional governments, each country can have a strategic advantage in the negotiation game.
5. According to FAO (2006) the average percentage of fishers among the economically active population in agriculture in high-seas fishing countries was around 3.9% in 1995. The average percentage of fishery exports per GDP among high-seas fishing countries was around 0. 8% in 1995. this group. The government might even pay relatively more attention to the preferences expressed via the industry's lobbying groups (Persson 1998 ) as compared to the general electorate. The fishing industry has private information about its compliance costs (Finus and Tjøtta 2003) , and the government can therefore capture votes from both the green voters and the fishing industry by signing an IEA with rather loose obligations. The government simply negotiates for low compliance goals at the signatory level and/or keeps the level of enforcement low.
A second subset of costs is related to the enforcement of an IEA. In many countries the fishing industry is dispersed over a number of locations and the central government delegates its control function related to the IEA to regional governments or bureaucratic agencies. Installing and maintaining a bureaucratic apparatus that controls compliance requires public funds that could be used to provide public goods elsewhere. These direct costs of enforcement depend on the country's level of institutional quality.
In this study our main interest is on the impact of international costs related to an IEA. These could be defined directly in the agreement or could result from sanctions or the loss in trustworthiness in strategic interactions among the signatory governments. For example, in a recent study, Rose and Spiegel (2009) demonstrate that noneconomic exchange (e.g., membership in IEAs) among countries increases the likelihood of engaging in economic exchange. At the community level (e.g., a small fisher town), repeated interaction among participants of an agreement makes the threat of sanctions more credible, thus increasing each participant's reduction effort and decreasing the incentive to free-ride (e.g., Ostrom 1990; Burton 2003) . Ostrom (1990) outlined a set of five broad characteristics that need to be met in order to have a stable agreement: (1) members support the rules of the agreement and effective monitoring, (2) outsiders can be excluded, (3) members or communities have repeated communication and dense social networks, (4) the harvesting (and compliance) effort of other members is observable, and (5) there are moderate rates of change in the stock of resources and the level of harvesting technology. So far, the literature (e.g., Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003) suggests that there are only a few settings in the world that fulfill all five conditions. Most of these cases can be found in situations where a common property resource is shared by a community in a narrowly defined geographic area.
Open access resources where sustainable management requires some form of international cooperation among a number of countries have so far been considered not to fulfill the necessary conditions for an Ostrom-type mechanism to manage open access resources. Let us first look at how the institutional framework created by the CoC actually performs vis-á-vis these five conditions. We basically go through the conditions one by one and examine how these characteristics apply to the CoC: (1) The participating nations agreed to a set of rules by signing the agreement. Although the CoC is voluntary, there is some legal document where signees clearly indicate their approval. If one member country does not comply with the agreement, there is at least the possibility for other members to refer to the legal document. (2) The CoC has been signed by more than 170 members of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Although it is not possible to exclude the remaining fishing nations, we are confident that new entrants play a negligible role. (3) Although the fishing industries from different nations do not engage in frequent face-to-face communication, the official representatives of the signatory countries do. They meet permanently in international boards (e.g., UN general assembly meetings, WTO meetings, Regional Fisheries Management Organizations) and engage in a wide number of negotiations (e.g., EU and NATO enlargement). Hence, there is strategic interaction among the participant countries, at least at the diplomatic level. In addition, there are bi-and multilateral tools that make the threat of sanctions very plausible in the event that a member country infringes the agreement's obligations. For example, EU-member countries use the veto threat to block participation aspirations of some of their neighboring countries, such as Turkey and Croatia. (4) It is often assumed that no signatory nation has information about another nation's compliance effort, and it could be hard to identify players that defect. However, this is not the case in high-seas fishing. Nowadays, fishing nations actually have very good information about other countries' fishing practices and harvesting effort, both legal and illegal. (5) It is probably not reasonable to assume a moderate change of technology over this 10-year period.
Although this is just a back-of-the-envelope comparison, its purpose is to illustrate that there is some ground for supporting the idea that, on an international level, strategic interaction among governments could affect a country's compliance behavior in the context of an IEA. Among Ostrom's characteristics, the extent of knowledge about other members' behavior (characteristic 4) and the frequency of interaction among countries (characteristic 3) define the probability that defection and undercompliance will be revealed as well as the likelihood that identified countries become the subjects of bi-or multilateral sanctions. Following Beron, Murdoch, and Vijverberg (2003) , we suspect that these characteristics, and therefore the likelihood of a sanction, are related to the strength of interaction between two countries. One common assumption is that the strength of interaction between the signatory countries is inversely related to the distance between two countries. First, distance has a significant impact on international trade and results in a more intense exchange between closer countries (Anderson and van Wincoop 2004) . Second, the number of interactions between official representatives of two countries also decreases relative to distance. Although most countries have representatives on multinational boards and organizations, there are other multinational institutions that comprise countries from only a specific region of the world (e.g., EU, MERCOSUR, ASEA, African Union, Regional Fisheries Management Organizations).
EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION
To analyze the effect of intergovernmental interaction on compliance with the CoC, we use a spatial Durbin model (Anselin 1988) given by specification (1),
where c i is the compliance score of country i, ω ij is a spatial weight assigned to country j by country i, c j is the compliance behavior of country j, and ρ is the corresponding parameter of interest. Strategic interaction between governments requires ρ to be statistically significant, where a nonzero coefficient implies that the country's level of compliance is a function of the effort made by other countries. According to our hypothesis, we expect ρ to have a positive sign, which indicates that the decision on the level of compliance is a strategic complement. The null hypothesis is that there is no strategic interaction effect between the governments, which suggests that the decision on the level of compliance is made independently. A country's decision on the level of effort is further influenced by a set of intracountry factors, X i . Further, country i's decision on the level of compliance is influenced by the intracountry characteristics of its neighbor countries, X j , and the corresponding spatial weight for country j, ω ij . 6 Finally, ε i is an error term that is assumed to be ε i ∼Nð0; σ 2 I n Þ. The advantage of the spatial Durbin model is that it nests several other model specifications, namely, the spatial autoregressive model, the spatial error model, the least-squares spatial lag X regression model and the nonspatial model and therefore allows for several specification tests.
7 Further, the spatial Durbin model, as LeSage and Pace (2009) point out, produces unbiased estimates no matter which of the discussed spatial data-generating processes is the true underlying data-generating process.
In line with Elhorst (2010) we apply the following test procedure to test the appropriateness of our model choice. First, equation (1) is estimated by using OLS and setting ρ = 0 and γ = 0. Then, the residuals of the nonspatial model are tested 6. The spatial weight ω ij for each country pair is assumed to be the same in the dependent as well as in the explanatory variables.
7. The spatial autoregressive model contains a spatial autoregressive process in the dependent variable. The spatial error model is characterized by a spatial autoregressive process in the error term, which is defined as
, where λ is a parameter that reflects the strength of interaction between country i and country j and v i is a well-behaved error term. The least-squares spatial lagged X regression model consists of a spatial autoregressive process in some or all explanatory variables. using Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests if the spatial lag model or spatial error model is more appropriate (Anselin 1988) . If the nonspatial model is rejected in favor of the spatial autoregressive model or spatial error model or both, the spatial Durbin model should be taken. Further, likelihood-ratio (LR) tests are applied to examine if the spatial Durbin model can then be reduced to a spatial lag, H 0 : γ = 0, or a spatial error model, H 0 : γ + ρβ = 0, or if the spatial Durbin model best describes the data. If one of the hypotheses cannot be rejected and the LM test points in that direction, the model can be reduced to a spatial lag or spatial error model. If the LM test suggests a model other than the LR test, the spatial Durbin model should be taken.
To address the simultaneity problem in the spatial context, we use a maximum likelihood estimation procedure to estimate equation (1) as proposed by Anselin (1988) . The log-likelihood function is given by
where
, and ρ is bounded by ðminðτÞ
where τ is an n × 1 vector of eigenvalues of the spatial weighting matrix W. This approach provides consistent estimates under the assumption that the error term is normally distributed. Our decision to use the ML approach was based on three reasons: First, ML performs better than a generalized method of moments instrumental variables (GMM IV) approach 8 when estimating a spatial Durbin model in the presence of spatially autocorrelated explanatory variables (Pace et al. 2013 ). 9 Second, the spatial Durbin model in combination with the GMM IV approach may result in a large number of variables as regressors in the first stage, which can be a problem in small samples. Third, Gibbons and Overman (2012) criticize the basic idea to use the spatial lags of X, WX, or a combination of WX with higher order lags W 2 X, W 3 X, and so forth as instruments for c j and estimate the model using a standard two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach. Gibbons and Overman (2012) make the point that the assumptions of validity and relevance of these instruments are often unlikely to hold.
8. As proposed by Kelejian and Prucha (1998) and Kelejian and Robinson (1993) . 9. Pace et al. (2013) do not really discuss the implications that nonnormality of the errors could have on the performance of the ML estimator. To deal with this issue, we performed a Doornik-Hansen omnibus test for multivariate normality. Further, the quantiles of the residuals were plotted against the quantiles of the normal distribution to have a graphical check on normality. Both procedures indicated a normal distribution of the residuals for all three compliance indicators.
3. DATA 3.1. Descriptive Statistics Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables. Because of missing data for the explanatory variables, we have to drop Faeroe Islands and Taiwan, which reduces our final sample from 53 to 51 countries. Tables A1 and  A2 in the appendix provide lists of the countries our sample is based on.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables are a set of indicators, CoC indicators, representing expert evaluations of a country's compliance with Article 7 of the CoC, and are taken from the study of Pitcher, Kalikoski, Short, et al. (2009) , who evaluated the performance of 53 out of 176 signatory countries using a set of 44 different score variables.
10
Each score variable ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating better compliance. The definition of the score variables is directly drawn from the clauses of the CoC. Pitcher, Kalikoski, Short, et al. (2009) use a large number of separate sources to derive the compliance score for each country, including national legislation, international treaties, country synopses from FAO, reports to FAO and NGOs, web pages of national fisheries agencies, NGO web pages as well as information of published work and fisheries experts. To ensure consistency, a formal scoring protocol was employed.
11 A subsample from these data has been used in Pitcher et al. (2009a) to evaluate the performance of 33 signatory countries in ecosystem-based management of fisheries. In addition, Pitcher, Kalikoski, Short, et al. (2009) use the overall compliance scores from the report and regress them on an indicator for corruption, the United Nations Human Development Index, and the Yale Environmental Performance Index. The latter study provides a basis for the choice of control variables in our empirical model. The 44 score variables can be broadly categorized into behavioral indicators, which contain mainly indicators that are quantifiable and have an immediate effect on fishing stocks, and intentional indicators, which comprise a number of performance indicators that could be considered less tangible and for which implementation and maintenance of some of these indicators do not necessarily require a large effort and funds from the government.
Because of the relatively small number of observations in our primary sample, we use a second set of variables that is available for a larger number of signatory 10. Given that these 53 countries account for 96% of the global marine catch, we are confident that sample selection bias plays a negligible role.
11. A more detailed description of the evaluation method can be found in Pitcher, Kalikoski, and Ganapathiraju (2006) . countries as a robustness exercise to estimate intergovernmental interaction in compliance with the CoC. The other indicators used are the Marine Trophic Index (MTI) and the area of Marine Protected Areas (MPA). These variables are direct measures of the effect of sustainable fishing practices on fish stocks or reflect more sustainable national fishing policies.
Information on MPAs is available for a sample containing 102 countries and stems from the MPA global database, which is a subproject of the Sea Around Us Project (Wood 2007) . It is a collection of all MPAs per country and provides information about the location of the MPA, the designation status, date, and the total area in square kilometers. The variable MPA is the total area of marine sites that received a designated MPA status between 1996 (the year after the CoC was signed) and 2005 (the year of the evaluation).
12 Further, we also use the difference, Δ MPA, between the total area of marine sites that received a designated MPA status between 1996 (the year after the CoC was signed) and 2005 (the year of the evaluation) and the total MPAs before the CoC went into force .
Dedicating an area in an MPA within a country's own EEZ can have two implications. First, it reduces the amount of available fishing area and available stock for exploitation, which may increase the fishing costs of the industry. Second, dedication of an area to an MPA could also have a signaling effect; because of its international visibility it reveals other countries' sustainable environmental behavior and compliance with the CoC. This, in turn, could have a beneficial impact on the international relations of that country.
The second two indicators, MTI and Δ MTI, are measures of the mean trophic level of fisheries landings (e.g., Pauly et al. 1998) .
13 MTI is the mean trophic level after the CoC entered into force (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) . The Δ MTI is the difference in the mean trophic level before (1985-95) and after (1996-2005) the CoC entered into force. It can be taken as a measure of abundance among larger fish on top of marine food webs, which represents the attainability and healthiness of a marine ecosystem. This measure was originally taken by Pauly et al. (1998) , who show a constant decrease in the trophic index, indicating that fisheries are relying more and more on the smaller short-lived fish of marine food webs. Data on MTI and the respective explanatory variables are available for 105 countries.
Independent Variables
We use empirical proxies similar to those of McWhinnie (2009) for technological capability, harvesting costs, and government's ability to enforce compliance. As data on fishery-specific technology are not available, we use the natural logarithm of a country's gross domestic product, GDP, to measure technical capability, and we expect countries with higher technological capabilities to achieve better compliance scores. Data on GDP per capita (current US$) stem from the CEPII gravity data set generated and used by Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010) .
14 To capture harvesting costs, we use the average distance from a country to the FAO zones in which it is operating, COST. We use a GIS-shapefile with coordinates of ports in each country and identify the closest port to each FAO area. We then calculate the great circle distance from this port to the center of an FAO zone and repeat this step for each FAO zone the country is fishing in. These distances are weighted by the country's fish catch in the respective FAO zone. The weighted average fishing costs are expected to be negatively correlated with compliance behavior.
The ability to enforce compliance can be approximated via a country's level of good governance and political stability (Fredriksson and Svensson 2003; Pitcher et al. 2009b; Ivanova 2011) . Therefore, we include a standard measure for political stability based on the World Bank's World Government Indicators, GOV. This variable reflects the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown and therefore provides a measure of perceived uncertainty of a government to remain in charge. 15 The degree of political stability, GOV, should have a positive impact on the level of compliance. Furthermore, a country's cost of compliance is negatively influenced by the degree of competition in the FAO area, COMPET. To capture this characteristic we calculate the total number of countries fishing in an FAO area divided by the total catch of all countries in that area. This is done for that area in which a country fishes the main fraction of its total catch. The former captures the strength of competition a country faces in a zone, while the latter allows us to take only the most relevant area in relation to a country's total fish catch into account.
Our measure on environmental performance, BIO, stems from the Yale Environmental Performance Index (Emerson et al. 2010) , which provides a composite index of six subareas. In line with Pitcher et al. (2009b) , we have chosen one of these subareas-biodiversity-for our measure of environmental performance of a country for the following reasons: First, there are concerns of high collinearity of the overall environmental performance index with the GDP of a country. This stems from the fact that 50% of the index is based on environmental health variables, such as water sanitation. Second, the biodiversity index is based on the following variables: the national extent of protected areas, a measure of the degree to which the country's wildest areas are protected, the timber harvest rate, and the oversubscription of water resources. In our opinion this subgroup best captures a country's attitude to sustainable management and use of natural resources and should have a positive impact on the compliance score.
To measure the size of the fishing industry in relation to the country size, EXPORT, we use the natural logarithm of a country's export value of fish, which stems from the FAO Fisheries Statistics, divided by the GDP of that country. The size of the fishing industry allows us to capture the potential of the industry to lobby against costly adaptations to more sustainable fishing measures. Bigger industries will more easily gain the attention of government, and politicians will avoid implementing policies that could affect many voters negatively in the short run. Therefore, it is expected to be negatively correlated with the level of compliance. To address the concern of reverse causality running from compliance with the CoC to a country's annual fish exports, we use the average export value for the period 1992-95 before the agreement entered into force. However, this strategy does not fully solve the problem of endogeneity because EXPORT prior to the agreement and compliance could be simultaneously determined by unobserved trends. As such, the coefficient of EXPORT should be interpreted with care.
The CoC not only covers management of high-seas fishing grounds but all fishing grounds, including EEZs and inland fisheries. As the latter two areas are less of a concern for other signees, we include a variable EEZ that is the fraction of the country's catch in its EEZs of its total catch. Because of the assigned property rights we expect the share of a country's catch in its EEZs to have a positive influence on the compliance measure.
Following the findings in Davies and Naughton (2014), a country's decision to participate in an IEA is not only influenced by its own amount but also by its neighbors' amount of ratified IEAs. To capture this effect, we include the sum of a country's involvement in 443 IEAs based on Rose and Spiegel (2009) . Because of the increased transparency and internationalization associated with signing international agreements, we expect a positive impact of this variable on the compliance score. Table A3 provides a more detailed description of the variables and their sources.
Weighting Matrix
To capture the process of the intergovernmental relationships, we specify a number of spatial weighting matrices based on two broad dimensions of distance, namely, geographic and political. Each of these measures have caveats, and there is no theoretical guidance about the functional form of the effect of intergovernmental interaction on compliance effort. As such, the estimates provide a range of results.
Our first measure is geographic distance. In the case of compliance with the CoC, the degree of intergovernmental interaction is affected through several channels. First, the degree of (non)compliance is more easily observed for countries that are geographically closer to each other. Second, intergovernmental interdependence is defined by the degree of interaction due to economic transactions and political relations, which decrease in distance. Third, interdependence is also influenced through the treaty subject itself, which is a common good and which is in general very localized in its appearance. We believe that, in our case, geographical proximity is highly correlated with true contact and interaction, which makes it an appropriate measure for the degree of spatial dependence affected through these various channels. The distance information was generated by using longitude and latitude information (taken from the CEPII database) of each country's most populated city, and calculated according to the great circle formula. Choosing the most populated city and not the capital of a country for our distance calculation allows us to capture the distance between the economic centers of the countries.
We use the exponential inverse distance between the most populated cities of each country pair to determine the off-diagonal elements of the matrix, w ij = expð -3d ij Þ. Using the exponential inverse distance simply assigns a stronger weight to closer countries, which emphasizes the quite localized interdependency of a country's decision on the level of compliance.
Finally, we have to make several assumptions in our specification of the weight matrix. First, we assume each country to be affected by all other countries in our sample, where closer countries are stronger weighted. Hence, we do not consider a group of countries to be entirely irrelevant for country i. Second, we assume the total spatial dependence to be homogeneous for all countries. Therefore, matrix W was row standardized so that each weight, w ij , could then be interpreted as the fraction of the overall spatial influence on country i from country j.
16 Both assumptions will be relaxed later in section 4.1.4. Geographic distance is, however, not a perfect measure of intergovernmental interaction. For example, India and Pakistan share a common border, but their governmental interaction is very limited because of numerous historical and contemporary conflicts. Albeit both countries can observe each others' fishing practices, the threat of sanctions due to noncompliance is rather small because of the overall lack of interaction between the two governments. In cases of countries that are close on a geographic dimension but distant on a political dimension, a spatial weighting matrix based on geographic distance would probably underestimate the effect of intergovernmental interaction. As such, the results from a spatial weighting matrix using geographic distance could be considered a lower bound of the estimates.
To account for the political interdependencies between the governments, we construct a measure of political distance. It is based on Rose and Spiegel (2009) , 16 . For an excellent discussion on the spatial weighting matrix, see a recently published paper by Neumayer and Plümper (2015) . which takes the mutual involvement in 443 IEAs of each country pair as a distance measure.
where g = 1 if country i and j signed treaty t and 0 otherwise, and d ij is the distance between country i and j.
Compared to political distance, geographic distance has the disadvantage that it is not able to account for discontinuities that exist in the political spheres. However, from an econometric perspective, geographic distance has the advantage that it can be considered as exogenous. A recent paper by Kelejian and Piras (2014) highlights the problem that spatial weighting matrices that are based on socioeconomic rather than physical distance measures are often endogenous. Typically, models with spatially lagged dependent variables that use a weighting matrix for which the exogeneity assumption is not justifiable yield biased and inconsistent estimates. To avoid this issue, we decided to use geographic distance as our preferred measure to construct a spatial weighting matrix. We then present results based on political distance as a robustness check in section 4.1.4.
RESULTS
The estimation results are based on the empirical specification (1) and on the identification strategy as outlined in section 2. Columns 1 and 2 of table 2 show the results for our general compliance indicator, which captures the countries' overall compliance with the CoC's obligations. First, using LM tests on the residuals of the nonspatial model suggest spatial autocorrelation in the dependent variable as well as in the error term. Second, the results of the LR tests indicate that the spatial Durbin model should be preferred to a spatial lag model, H 0 : γ = 0, and to a spatial error model, H 0 : γ + ρβ = 0.
The sign of the spatial lag, ρ, is positive and significant at the 1% level. This suggests that a country's compliance behavior is positively influenced by strategic interaction with the other signatory countries. Further, ln(GDP) has a significant and positive impact on enforcement behavior, indicating that more developed countries induce more compliance effort. Countries that face higher costs to reach fishing grounds also have a higher compliance. This result is in line with McWhinnie (2009), who shows that fish stocks in FAO areas that are closer to important fishing ports are more depleted than fish stocks in more distant FAO areas. In addition, countries with a higher political stability (GOV) also have significantly better compliance scores, which supports the idea that those countries can more easily implement and enforce legislation related to the compliance with the CoC. We also find that countries that have signed more IEAs (TREATY) are more likely to comply with the CoC. This result supports the findings by Davies and Naughton (2014) . Surprisingly, countries with a higher share of fish exports, ln(EXPORT), also perform better in the overall compliance measure. This result stands in contrast to the idea that governments of countries with a larger fishing industry are more likely to be lobbied to avoid environmental policies that could increase the costs to the fishing industry. Our findings would actually suggest the opposite, that the benefits associated with the CoC, for Anselin (1988, eqs. 6.25-6.34 ).
** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
example, a more constant long-term yield of fish due to sustainable management of the resource, are actually higher than the costs for the fishing industry, and therefore those countries simply induce more effort. One potential concern is that TREATY as well as ln(EXPORT) are endogenous. TREATY and compliance as well as ln(EXPORT) and compliance could be simultaneously driven by some other unobserved variables, and therefore their coefficients could be biased. Consequently, one should be cautious with the interpretation of these estimated coefficients. More importantly, however, an endogenous TREATY and ln(EXPORT) in the specification could potentially bias the estimates of our coefficient of interest, ρ, if they are correlated with ω ij c j . In a robustness test, we reestimated the main specification for overall compliance in table 2, first excluding TREATY, then excluding ln(EXPORT), and then excluding both variables together. In all estimates, neither ρ nor the coefficients of the other parameters change in size or statistical significance.
17 And finally, a higher share of catch in their own EEZ as well as the indicator for biodiversity (BIO) do not have a statistically significant impact on the overall compliance score. Columns 3 and 4 in table 2 report the results for the subgroup of compliance indicators that require real behavior. Again, our identification strategy indicates the spatial Durbin model to be our preferred model specification. Strategic interaction, measured by our spatial lag, ρ, has again a positive and significant (at the 1% level) influence on a country's compliance behavior. Countries with a higher political stability, with a higher GDP per capita, with higher harvesting costs, and which have signed more IEAs have significantly better compliance scores. Also, countries with a higher share of catch in their own EEZ have significantly better compliance scores. Again, average competition in the FAO area depicts a negative but insignificant coefficient. We find that the export share of the fishing sector in neighboring countries has a negative impact on compliance with behavioral indicators, which is significant at the 10% level.
Finally, we repeat our empirical exercise for the subset of intentional indicators, which is summarized in columns 5 and 6 in table 2. The results of the LR tests indicate that the spatial Durbin model should be preferred to a spatial lag model, H 0 : γ = 0. For a spatial error model, H 0 : γ + ρβ = 0, the hypothesis cannot be 17. Excluding TREATY yields a coefficient estimate of the spatial lag, ρ (standard errors in parentheses), of 0.369 (0.110); excluding ln(EXPORT): 0.375 (0.110); excluding both TREATY and ln(EXPORT): 0.378 (0.109). Full sets of results are available upon request. Although the results of this robustness exercise are comforting, they are no panacea to the problem of endogenous covariates. If TREATY and/or ln(EXPORT) are part of the model, excluding those variables creates another omitted variable problem that might bias the coefficient estimate of ρ.
rejected. Following LeSage and Pace (2009) , the spatial Durbin model will produce inefficient but unbiased coefficient estimates for cases where the true data-generating process is the spatial error model. However, where the true data-generating process is the spatial Durbin model, the spatial error model will produce biased coefficient estimates as this model does not include the spatially lagged explanatory variables and the spatial lagged dependent variable. Therefore, our preferred specification is the spatial Durbin model.
Strategic interaction plays a significant role on enforcement effort regarding the intentional objective of the CoC, although only at the 5% level of significance. Once again, political stability and GDP per capita appear to be the main drivers of compliance with indicators that signal good intention. Further, countries which have signed more IEAs have a higher degree of compliance. In contrast to the results of the overall and behavioral indicators, compliance with intentional objectives of the CoC seems to be significantly driven by the demand for environmental quality, measured by our biodiversity variable. Countries' costs to reach a fishing ground have no significant influence on the compliance levels with the intentional objective of the CoC.
Robustness and Sensitivity
We next perform a number of robustness checks to see whether our results are sensitive to the choice of the estimator, alternative dependent and independent variables, as well as different weighting matrices and forms of row standardization. In general, we report the results of these robustness exercises for the general compliance indicator only. Just in cases where the robustness exercises yield significantly different results for the two other indicators, Behavior and Intention, we report the results of those as well.
2SLS and Reduced Form Models
A signatory country's own and all the other signatory countries' compliance effort could be simultaneously determined by other unobserved factors leading to a biased coefficient of the spatial lag. To overcome this problem, we apply an instrumental variable approach suggested by Anselin (1988) and estimate equation (1) using a two-stage least squares estimator (2SLS). We construct a set of instrumental variables for the spatially lagged dependent variable following Kelejian, Prucha, and Yuzefovich (2004) , and use W 2 X and W 3 X as exogenous instruments to identify the model. Columns 1 and 2 in table 3 present the results of this robustness exercise for our overall compliance indicator. The size and significance of our explanatory variables stay robust. The Hansen J-test on overidentifying restrictions yields a p-value of .36 and thereby does not reject the null that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the second stage. But the first-stage F-statistics are 5.92, which suggests a weak instrument bias. This is in line with Elhorst (2014) , who states that one problem in case of the spatial Durbin model and the instru-mental variable approach is that the number of potential strong instruments is low, since this model already contains the variables X and WX as explanatory variables. Therefore, we prefer the maximum likelihood estimation procedure to estimate equation (1). In addition, the instrumental variable approach to estimate spatial econometric models has been criticized because the instruments based on weighted lags are unlikely to fulfill the exclusion restrictions, and therefore the results do not necessarily lead to consistent estimates (Gibbons and Overman 2012) . To address these identification concerns, we are following a suggestion of Gibbons and Overman (2012) by estimating a reduced-form spatial lag X (SLX) model using OLS. In this model, In contrast to the results of the SDM models, none of the spatially lagged explanatory variables have a significant impact on the compliance behavior. Finally, the LR tests suggest that the spatial Durbin model should be preferred to the SLX model in describing our data. This indicates that the interaction in compliance effort has an important impact on a country's own decision to comply with the CoC.
Quantitative Indicators
The estimation results for the measure of the size of marine protected areas, MPA, are presented in columns 1 and 2 in table 4. Our estimate of spatial interaction, ρ, is positive and significant at the 1% level. This suggests that countries interact strategically when designating fishing zones to MPAs and that signalling benefits are a strong incentive. Further, countries with a higher degree of competition and good overall environmental performance also designated more MPAs in the decade following the signing of the CoC. In the next step, we estimate specification (1) for the change in MPA designation before and after the agreement went into force (cols. 3 and 4 in table 4). Interestingly, we do not find a significant effect of strategic interaction, ρ. This suggests that in the period when the CoC is in force, a convergence in our measure of sustainable national fishing policies can be observed.
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The estimation results for the marine trophic level of fisheries landing, MTI, are shown in columns 5 and 6 and for Δ MTI in columns 7 and 8 in table 4. Again, we can observe the same patterns as in the previous indicator. We find a strong spatial interdependence in the mean trophic level after the CoC entered into force, whereas we do not find any significant spatial interdependence in the change of the mean trophic level in the period before and after the agreement entered into force. 18. We also estimated specification (1) using the amount of MPA designation before the agreement went into force as a dependent variable. The coefficient of the spatial lag is not statistically significant. 19. The mean trophic level of fisheries landings did not withstand the falsification test. The coefficient of ρ for the mean trophic level before the agreement went into force is positive and significant, which suggests a spatial interdependence in the trophic level of fisheries landings in the time before the CoC went into force. The reason for this can be that this spatial interdependence is additionally influenced by migrating fish stocks.
Additional Control Variables
We further add a dummy variable EU that accounts for countries that are subject to the EU's common fisheries policy (CFP). Due to the strict top-down structure of the CFP and a choice of inefficient fishery management tools, the CFP leads to an alarming state of many fish stocks within European waters. Following Gray and Hatchard (2003) and Daw and Gray (2005) , the EU CFP can be seen as a political success but an environmental failure. As expected, members of the European Union (EU) sharing the EU CFP have a significantly lower compliance score (see cols. 1 and 2 in table 5). Our other estimates stay robust, and our measure of strategic interaction, ρ, depicts a positive and significant influence on a country's overall compliance behavior.
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With accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) countries restrict themselves in using the most common and easiest enforcement mechanism in global environmental politics, namely, trade embargoes (Eckersley 2004) . To capture this effect, a dummy variable is included that indicates when a country is a member of the WTO. The impact of this variable is twofold. First, because of the increased transparency and internationalization associated with signing the agreement, it is expected to have a positive influence on the compliance score. However, second, due to the loss of an important international enforcement mechanism, the WTO status may also have a negative impact on c i . Our results, as depicted in columns 3 and 4 in table 5, suggest, because of the increased transparency and internationalization, a significant positive impact of a WTO membership on a country's level of compliance. Further, we find that the neighbors' WTO status has a negative impact on a country's compliance effort, which supports the idea of a decreased enforcement potential due to WTO membership. Finally, our other estimates stay robust, and our measure of strategic interaction, ρ, depicts a positive and significant influence on a country's overall compliance behavior.
Weighting Matrix Alternatives
Based on our discussion in section 1.2 we assume that a weight matrix based on geographic distance best describes the spatial dependence, such that specification (1) represents the true data-generating process. However, because theory does not provide guidance on the degree to which spatial dependence decreases as distance increases, we start to test the robustness of our results by analyzing the sensitivity of our model specification on the choice of the weighting matrix (see table 6 ). First, a weight matrix of spatial interdependence is calculated using the simple inverse distance between the most populated city of each country pair in our sample. This 20. These results can also be found in the behavioral indicator. However, there is no significant effect of intergovernmental interaction in the intentional indicator. Note.-Weight matrix: exponential inverse distance. Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level and calculated from the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix following Anselin (1988, eqs. 6.25-6.34 ). ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. Anselin (1988, eqs. 6.25-6.34 ).
** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. underlies a linear relationship between distance and strength of interdependency between the governments. The results in the explanatory variables stay relatively stable in sign and strength. However, it can be observed that with this weighting scheme the importance of strategic interaction in overall compliance with the CoC is still positive but no longer significant, which supports the idea of geographic concentration in the interaction intensity. Second, we use a weight matrix based on the squared inverse distance between the countries to estimate specification (1). The results stay robust with a positive and significant spatial interdependence in overall compliance with the CoC.
Third, we apply a nearest neighbor concept, where countries are defined to be neighbors if the distance between their most populated cities is less than 3,150 kilometers, which is the minimum distance from the most remote country in our sample to its nearest neighbor. This cutoff point has been taken in order to avoid a so-called island states effect in weight matrices (Anselin 1988) . The off-diagonal elements of the weight matrix have been determined in the following way. If countries are outside those distance bands, they are assigned a value of 0. If they are inside those distance bands, the off-diagonal elements of the matrix are defined by the exponential inverse distance as in the basic specification. This weighting matrix gives closer neighbors the strongest weight by totally ignoring the influence of remote signatory countries. The results stay robust, with a positive significant interdependence in our overall compliance indicator. These results suggest that strategic interaction is stronger among close neighbors but loses importance in an exponential degree of distance.
Fourth, we use a weight matrix based on political distance to estimate specification (1). The results stay robust with a positive and significant spatial interdependence in overall compliance with the CoC. 21. In an additional robustness test we have used spatial weight matrices based on genetic and linguistic distance. Following the work by Fearon (2003) and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) , genetic and linguistic distance between two countries can be considered as measures of "cultural distance" and thereby as another metric for the strength of intergovernmental relationships between two countries. However, using these distance measures does not yield any statistically significant results for the spatial lag. Our interpretation of these results is the following: consider the example of the United States and Australia. They are culturally very closely related (measured by genetic and linguistic distance) and they have strong intergovernmental ties, but geographically they are very far from each other. More importantly in our context, they also do not share many common fishing grounds. As such, they do not observe each other's compliance effort that often, and the chances for disputes are relatively low. This suggests that a distance measure that puts a larger weight on the likelihood of observing compliance provides a better picture of the effect of intergovernmental interactions on compliance effort. The results are available upon request. Anselin (1988, eqs. 6.25-6.34 ). ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
Finally, the convention to row standardize the weighting matrix in spatial econometric applications has recently come under some criticism. Kelejian and Prucha (2010) and Neumayer and Plümper (2015) argue that row standardization is inferential, not neutral, and may, unless theoretical issues suggest a row-normalized weighting matrix, result in a misspecified model. To account for this, we follow Kelejian and Prucha (2010) and normalize our weighting matrix using a minmax procedure. In this procedure, each cell of W is divided by m = min½maxðr i Þ; maxðc i Þ, where r i is the largest row sum of W and c i the largest column sum of W.
22 Table 7 reports the results of estimating specification (1) using a minmaxnormalized weighting matrix. In all three compliance indicators, the test statistics suggest that the spatial Durbin model is the preferred model specification. Strategic interaction, measured by our spatial lag ρ, is positive and significant in the overall compliance indicator, whereas in the case of the intentional and behavioral indicator, strategic interaction in compliance remains positive but is no longer significant. The impact of the other explanatory variables remain robust.
Given the robustness of strategic interaction measured by the indicator for overall compliance with the CoC, we commence our calculation of the marginal effects and comparative statics using only this measure. Further, we will use minmax standardization of the weight matrix, which allows for a higher variation in W and consequently in the spatially lagged dependent variable and spatially lagged explanatory variables and therefore to a more precise parameter estimation in our simulation. However, it has to be noted that the estimates of the spatial spillover effects are sensitive to the choice of the weight matrix. Although the sign of the main coefficients stays the same and the size of the coefficients is mostly in a comparable range to the estimates presented in tables 8 and 9, a row standardized weight matrix yields bigger standard errors and most of the coefficients are no longer statistically significant at conventional levels.
Determining the Impact of Spatial Spillovers
The dependence structure in a spatial regression model allows us to retrieve more detailed information about the interaction effects (LeSage and Pace 2009). Consider, for example, the effect of institutional quality, GOV. An improvement in this variable in country i will have a direct effect on the compliance of country i as well as an indirect effect on the compliance of all other countries due to the spatial dependence. To understand the dependence structure in the spatial Durbin model and to derive the direct and indirect effect, we follow LeSage and Pace (2009) and look at the datagenerating process as formulated in equation (4), 22 . Dividing the elements of W by one single scalar does not change the relative relevance of senders across recipients. Therefore, it is neutral and allows for a rescaling of the autoregressive parameter equivalent to the unnormalized weighting matrix.
where ðI n -ρWÞ
and rewrite part of the right-hand side in equation (4) as
where r stands for the explanatory variables. Following LeSage and Pace (2009) and Kim, Phipps, and Anselin (2003) , the data-generating process can then be written as
SrðWÞ 
It follows from equation (7) that the derivative of c i with respect to x r will be potentially nonzero, is determined by the i,jth element of matrix S r (W), and can be divided into a direct and an indirect effect. For country i the direct effect measures the impact of a change in an explanatory variable x ir on its compliance level, for example, the direct effect of a change in institutional quality on country i's compliance level, and is defined as
The indirect effect measures the impact of a change in another country's explanatory variable x jr on the compliance level of country i, for example, the effect of a change in another country's institutional quality on country i's compliance level, and is defined as
This implies that a change in the explanatory variable of a country has a potential impact on the dependent variable of all other countries and vice versa. This originates in the definition of our spatial Durbin model, which takes other countries' dependent and explanatory variables through Wy and WX into account. Consequently, every diagonal element of the n × n matrix S r (W) represents a direct effect and every off-diagonal element of S r (W) represents an indirect effect. The Anselin (1988, eqs. 6.25-6.34 ).
magnitude of these effects is different for different countries and will depend upon their position in space, the degree of connectivity among them, which is determined by the spatial weight matrix W, the parameter ρ, which represents the strength of spatial dependence in compliance effort, and the parameters β and γ. Therefore, to present these effects, we follow LeSage and Pace (2009) and use scalar summary measures as defined by
MðrÞ direct = n -1 trðS r ðWÞÞ;
where tr stands for trace of the matrix and ι n denotes an n × 1 vector of ones. The expression MðrÞ direct is the average direct effect, which is calculated as the average of the diagonal of S r (W). The expression MðrÞ total is the average total effect, which is the average over all derivatives of c i with respect to x jr for any i and j, that is, the average of all sums down the columns of S r (W). And finally, MðrÞ indirect represents the average indirect effect, which is the difference between the average total effect and the average direct effect and equals the average column sum of the off-diagonal elements in S r (W). By taking the column sum, we interpret the average indirect effect as the change in the level of compliance of all other countries resulting from a change in the rth explanatory variable of a country in our sample.
To draw inference regarding the statistical significance of the impact estimates, we follow LeSage and Pace (2009) by producing simulated parameters from the normally distributed parameters ρ, β, γ, and σ 2 drawn from the variance-covariance matrix coming from the maximum likelihood estimates. 23 The overall direct and indirect effects can then be estimated using the mean value of these draws. The tvalues are calculated by dividing each mean by its corresponding standard deviation. Table 8 presents the scalar summary measures for a marginal increase in the kth explanatory variable across all countries in our sample, which accounts for spatial spillover effects and is divided into the average direct, indirect, and total effect. The direct impact in table 8 indicates the impact on country i due to a change in the respective explanatory variable. Comparing the coefficients of the direct impact as presented in table 8 with the coefficients in table 7, we can see that the results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar, except for the GDP. Any differences in the results stem from feedback effects that arise because country i is considered a neighbor to its neighbors so that some effects that pass through the neighboring countries will have feedback effects on the country itself. The results in table 8 basically 23 . The variance-covariance matrix of the parameter estimates of the spatial Durbin model can be found in Elhorst and Fréret (2009). highlight that COST, GOV, EEZ, and TREATY are the main direct determinants of overall compliance.
The average indirect effect represents the cumulative impact of a change in an explanatory variable of one country on the average level of compliance of its neighbors, where closer countries, as defined by our spatial weighting matrix, experience a stronger impact than more remote ones. Again, comparing those coefficients with the coefficient estimates of the spatially lagged explanatory variables of our spatial Durbin model in table 7, we can confirm the overall pattern, albeit the size of the coefficients is slightly different. This difference is a result of the spatial multiplier, the first part of the right-hand side of equation (4), that is, (I -ρW)
, which accounts for the strength of spatial interaction between the countries. GDP, BIO, EEZ, and TREATY are the main drivers of the indirect effect on overall compliance. Finally, the average total impact estimates present the sum of the direct and indirect effects. This can be seen as the average total effect on country i from a change in the explanatory variables from all countries in the sample, which accounts for the spillover effects within the spatial system. The results of the total effect reveal an interesting pattern. While other countries' GDP and COST do not appear to have systematic impact on compliance via intergovernmental relationships, GOV, EEZ, and TREATY do. This means that being located close to a fishing nation with good governance, which has a relatively high portion of their fish production from their Anselin (1988, eqs. 6.25-6.34 ).
own EEZ and which is involved in many other IEAs, has a positive effect on my own compliance behavior. In other words, factors that influence the allocation of property rights (EEZ and TREATY) and the enforcement of property rights (GOV) in one country positively influence compliance behavior in nearby countries through intergovernmental linkages. Countries that rank highly in all of these three variables and might therefore have a pull effect on nearby countries' compliance effort are, for example, Canada, New Zealand, and Sweden. Since table 8 represents cumulative parameter estimates for a marginal increase in the kth explanatory variable across all countries in our sample, we are not able to examine the dissemination of the impact of a change in compliance effort of a particular country or group of countries in space. Therefore, following Egger et al. (2008) , we exogenously change a single country's explanatory variable by an amount that results in a unit change in the level of compliance, ΔβX k þγWX k =1. For instance, a unit change based on GOV corresponds to a change in GOV by 0.270 because the corresponding parameter estimates areβ 2 þγ 2 = 1:035 þ 2:669. For all other explanatory variables unit changes can be calculated in the same way. The advantage of this approach is that equation (4) , which allows us to focus entirely on the spatial effects of a change in compliance effort. The magnitude of these effects depends on the position of the country in space, the degree of connectivity among the countries, and the strength of spatial dependence. Following our discussion on intergovernmental relationship and compliance behavior, we expect that strategic interactions between governments make a threat of sanctions for noncompliance more credible. Furthermore, we assume that the potential to sanction noncompliance is not equally distributed among the participating countries but, rather, depends on specific characteristics, like the level of economic development. To capture these differences, in table 9, we summarize the spatial effects of a unit change in an explanatory variable for country groups that differ in their level of economic development, which is measured by GDP per capita.
We start by considering an average total effect of a change in an explanatory variable that results in a separate unit increase in compliance for each country in our sample. This yields an average total effect of 1.230, which consists of a direct effect and a spatial spillover effect. The direct effect again compromises two components: a direct effect due to the change in the explanatory variable, which is 1 by definition, and a spatial feedback effect of 0.019, which reflects impacts passing through neighboring countries and back. The spatial spillover is the average spatial impact on the compliance level of the other countries and is with 0.211 much stronger than the spatial feedback effect on the country itself. Now let us consider a case where only the quartile with the highest economic development changes their compliance by 1. This results in a total effect of 1.661, which consists of a direct effect of 1 due to a change in the explanatory variable, a spatial feedback effect of 0.058, and a spatial spillover effect on the other countries of 0.602. In the case where only countries in the lowest quartile of economic development change their compliance by 1, the total effect is only 1.044 with a spatial feedback effect of 0.003 and a spatial spillover effect of 0.041. Comparing the impact of a unit change in compliance behavior of the highest with the lowest quartile in economic development shows that the difference is mainly due to a change in the spatial spillover effect. In a further step, we increase the group size to analyze the behavior of this effect in more detail. Therefore, we divided the sample into two equally sized groups, a group with relatively richer and a group with relatively poorer economies. Focusing on the spatial effects, we are able to observe an interesting outcome. Whereas the spatial effect of the group of poorer nations is nearly constant, the spatial effect of the group of richer nations changes considerably. The degree of difference in the size of the spatial effect of these groups suggests that the position of the countries in space and the degree of connectivity among the countries, that is, the potential channels to sanction noncompliance, matter a lot on how changes in compliance effort disseminate to other countries.
CONCLUSION
The existing literature about the impact of strategic interactions on the success of voluntary agreements on sustainable resource use has only focused on small communities with frequent interactions among participants. This paper suggests that someinternational environmental agreements and existing intergovernmental relations fulfill, to a certain extent, the criteria of an Ostrom-type mechanism to manage open access resources. Modern technology allows countries to observe other signatory countries' compliance behavior, while repeated intergovernmental relationships make the threat of sanctions credible in the case of noncompliance. Overall, our results suggest that intergovernmental relationships have an impact on a country's effort to enforce the objectives of an IEA on open access resources. Factors that improve the allocation and enforcement of property rights in one country can positively influence compliance behavior in nearby countries. In particular, countries with good governance who harvest most of their fish in their own EEZ and who have signed other IEAs seem to have the strongest pull effect on other countries. One policy conclusion from our results is that improving property rights for fisheries in one country is not only beneficial for the country itself but could result in positive spillover effects to neighboring countries. Here, it is important to point out that the results of the spatial spillover effects are sensitive to the choice of the normalization procedure used in the weight matrix. Although the sign and size of the direct, indirect, and total effects of our main variables are in comparable range across different normalization approaches, standard row normalization yields coefficient estimates that are no longer significant at conventional levels. Therefore, the results of the spatial spillover effects need to be interpreted with care.
Overall, the low levels of overall compliance with the agreement indicate that strategic interaction on the international level is not a sufficient constraint to ensure the sustainable management of an open access resource. Nevertheless, the result that signatory countries of a voluntary IEA take into account neighboring countries' compliance effort can help to lead to better policy instruments in an area of international governance where mandatory agreements are hard to establish. Another policy recommendation would therefore be that voluntary IEAs could improve their success by frequently updating each participant about the compliance effort of the other participants or by improving communication between the signatory countries. COST Minimum great circle distance between port and center of a fishing zone weighted by the amount a country is fishing in that zone
